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A Corner Turned:
Supreme Court of Canada Decisions
of the Year Past
Charlotte A. Bell, Q.C.∗

I. INTRODUCTION
This year, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down two significant
decisions, R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard 1 (and its Nova Scotia
counterpart, R. v. Stephen Marshall),2 and Mikisew Cree First Nation v.
Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage).3
Superficially read, these cases seem to represent a complete
turnabout — in one case the Court adopts a very restrictive posture
towards the protection of Aboriginal rights, and in the next, seems to
adopt the opposite.
Upon a more thoughtful read, when taken together, the cases
suggest a more cohesive approach, and indicate where the Supreme
Court is heading in the area of assertion and protection of Aboriginal
rights. The purpose of this paper is to examine the two cases with a view
to extracting their themes, and then joining these themes together in the
articulation of a cohesive theory that will reveal the direction the Court
will likely go in future Aboriginal rights cases.
The paper will start with a brief review of the facts, findings of law,
and conclusion as to the underlying approach of each case seriatum. It
will conclude by comparing each of these seemingly inconsistent

∗

I gratefully acknowledge the fine work of my colleague Sheldon Massie in the following
review of the cases. The entire case outline is his work. My work consists only of the sections
headed “Impression of the Direction of the Supreme Court of Canada”, and “The Balance in the
Result.” [The following is what I think, and not in any way reflective of the views or approaches of
my employer or my instructing principal, the Department of Justice, or the Attorney General of
Canada.]
1
[2005] S.C.J. No. 44, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, 2005 SCC 43.
2
Id.
3
[2005] S.C.J. No. 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, 2005 SCC 69.
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approaches, and discussing how the apparent inconsistency can be
resolved.

II. R. V. JOSHUA BERNARD AND R. V. STEPHEN MARSHALL
The Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in R. v. Bernard and
R. v. Marshall on July 20, 2005. The Court held the accused had not
established either a treaty right to commercially harvest timber or
Aboriginal title to the logging sites.
1. Background
The two appeals arise from provincial prosecutions in New Brunswick
and Nova Scotia for the commercial harvesting and sale of timber from
provincial Crown land. The Aboriginal defendants asserted the
unauthorized activity was a constitutionally protected right under the
1760-61 Halifax treaties, and as an incident of their communities’
Aboriginal title to the land. Canada intervened in the appeals at the
Supreme Court of Canada, heard together January 17, 2005, and argued
against both propositions.
2. The Decision
The Court combined its reasons for both decisions, and was unanimous
in their dismissal of the defendants’ appeals from conviction. The
reasons of McLachlin C.J. were concurred in by Major, Bastarache
Abella and Charron JJ. Justice LeBel wrote separate reasons with which
Fish J. concurred.
The majority concluded the treaty at issue granted the Mi’kmaq the
right to continue to trade in the products that they had traditionally
traded with Europeans. The issue, properly framed, was whether trade in
a particular commodity was in the contemplation of the parties at the
time of the making of the treaty. On the evidence, the Court concluded
that trade in timber was not within the contemplation of the parties. The
majority also confirmed that though treaty rights are not frozen in time
and can evolve, this evolution does not mean the core right or protected
activity may transform itself, but that the modern means of exercising a
right are protected.

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Supreme Court of Canada Decisions

435

The majority concluded that in order to establish Aboriginal title an
Aboriginal society must provide proof of the intention and capacity to
retain exclusive control over the claimed territory at the time of
sovereignty. This means activity on the land that is sufficiently regular
and exclusive to comport with title at common law. They concluded
there were no grounds to interfere with the trial judges’ findings that
there was insufficient evidence of regular and exclusive use of the
cutting sites by the Mi’kmaq people.
The Court also found that the jurisprudence and historical context
did not support a conclusion that the Royal Proclamation of 1763
reserved Aboriginal title in the former colony of Nova Scotia, and there
was no basis for finding title to the cutting sites on the basis of the
earlier and discredited Belcher’s Proclamation of 1762.
3. Impression of the Direction of the Supreme Court of Canada
(a) Treaty Rights
The Supreme Court of Canada has, in Bernard, clearly said that the
exercise of traditional treaty rights will be protected. The emphasis here
is on the word “traditional”. A right practised at the time of treaty
cannot transmute into a modern practice. And so, hunting, fishing and
gathering, things that were done historically, will attract constitutional
protection, even if the way one hunts, fishes or gathers changes, but
these activities cannot evolve into activities such as lumbering or
mining.
The Court came to the decision that it did by focusing on the
“common intention” of the parties — certainly a legitimate exercise for
interpreting an agreement between two parties.
But there was another common intention of the parties, another
focus that could have been chosen, in order to determine what the
parties had hoped to gain by entering into the treaty. The focus might
well have been that the parties wished to ensure that the Mi’kmaq would
not become a burden on the British Crown. The common intention of
the parties with respect to how to achieve this focus, would be to enable
the Mi’kmaq to participate in the economy of the British colony by
giving them guaranteed access to the raw materials of the colony, which
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they would then use to trade: a “strategy of economic aboriginal selfsufficiency”. 4
If this approach to isolating the common intention of the parties had
been employed, the result would have been to position the Mi’kmaq as
partners in the exploitation of the resources of the provinces, and
participants in the modern economy. Instead, the decision positions
them as a community entitled to exercise traditional rights.
(b) Aboriginal Title
The map of Canada, as envisioned by some, looked very different
before and after the Bernard and Marshall decisions. The 1997
Delgamuukw decision evoked visions of vast tracts of hunting territory,
“exclusively used and occupied” by a First Nation (essentially, being
under the sovereign power of a First Nation), that were declared to be,
in the present day, lands from which the First Nation was entitled to
exclude all others, even the Crown.
However, the Bernard and Marshall decisions introduced new
language into the definition of Aboriginal title. The mantra “exclusive
use and occupation” is now more adjective intense. In order to establish
title to land, a claimant must demonstrate that their activity was
“sufficiently regular and exclusive” and thus, comports with title at
common law.5
This expanded definition severely limits the expectation of the size
of a tract that can be declared subject to Aboriginal title. The
speculation after Delgamuukw was that all of the territory between and
around an even infrequently used hunting tract would qualify as
Aboriginal title. Some might say that now, only actual village sites can
qualify.

4

See: R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 [hereinafter “Marshall
1”], at para. 25: “Starvation breeds discontent. The British certainly did not want the Mi’kmaq to
become an unnecessary drain on the public purse of the colony of Nova Scotia or of the Imperial
purse in London, as the trial judge found.” … “The same strategy of economic aboriginal selfsufficiency was pursued across the prairies in terms of hunting: see R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 901, per Wilson J., at p. 919, and Cory J., at p. 928. and para. 35 “The trade clause would
not have advanced British objectives (peaceful relations with a self-sufficient Mi’kmaq people) or
Mi’kmaq objectives (access to the European “necessaries” on which they had come to rely) unless
the Mi’kmaq were assured at the same time of continuing access, implicitly or explicitly, to a
harvest of wildlife to trade.”
5
R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, supra, note 1, at para. 58.
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III. MIKISEW CREE V. CANADA
The Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Mikisew Cree
First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage) on November
24, 2005.
The Court set aside a decision of the Minister of Heritage
authorizing construction of a winter road in Wood Buffalo National
Park. It found the Crown has an obligation to meaningfully consult
Treaty 8 First Nations on decisions that may interfere with their right to
hunt, trap and fish within the treaty territory, and that this duty had not
been adequately met.
1. Background
Treaty 8 was made in 1899 and extends across what is now northern
Alberta and parts of British Columbia, Saskatchewan and the Northwest
Territories. It provides for the Indians’ right “ . . . to pursue their usual
vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract
surrendered . . . saving and excepting such tracts as may be required or
taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or
other purposes.”
The treaty encompasses Wood Buffalo National Park, within whose
boundaries the Mikisew Cree First Nation have reserve land and carry
on traditional hunting, fishing and trapping activities.
The Thebacha Road Society, an umbrella organization of
community and other Aboriginal interests in the vicinity of the park,
proposed and sought permission to construct the road through the park.
As planned, it would have cut across the hunting and trapping territory
of certain members of the Mikisew Cree First Nation. Following an
environmental review, and some limited communications with the First
Nation and its members, the Minister of Heritage (then responsible for
the park) approved construction of the road.
At issue was whether the Minister of Heritage infringed the Treaty 8
rights of the First Nation in approving the road, and the nature of the
Crown’s obligations when “taking up” land pursuant to the treaty. The
Crown argued the road did not infringe the treaty because the taking up
or proposed use was contemplated by the treaty, and that the
communications with the First Nation constituted adequate consultation
in the circumstances.
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2. The Decision
The Court accepted the Crown’s argument that the road was one of the
purposes contemplated by the treaty for which land may be taken up,
and was not an infringement of the treaty right requiring justification. It
found, however, that the Crown had an obligation to consult with the
Mikisew Cree First Nation, whose treaty rights would be adversely
affected by the construction of the road, and that on the facts of this case
the duty was not met, the consultation never having effectively “got off
the ground”.
The Court found that the duty to consult flows from the honour of
the Crown and its obligation to respect existing treaty rights, and is a
“process” right. It also stated “... consultation is key to achievement of
the overall objective of the modern law of treaty and aboriginal rights,
namely, reconciliation.”
Though the duty to consult arises whenever the low threshold of an
“adverse impact” is evident, its content will vary with the degree of
adverse impact. In the circumstances here its content was said to lie at
the low end of the spectrum, but to be meaningful had to be direct, and
in advance of any decision being made. It required notice and
information about the project be provided, and interests and concerns be
solicited, identified, and considered so that adverse impacts might be
minimized, and where appropriate, concerns accommodated.
3. Impression of the Direction of the Supreme Court of Canada
The concept of “the honour of the Crown” has been articulated by courts
in reasons for judgment for years, indeed for centuries. However, it has
moved into the spotlight in the past two years, and appears to be
replacing fiduciary duty as the construct employed by courts to achieve
what they believe to be the fair and just result.
In Mikisew Cree, the “honour of the Crown” was applied to
require that the Crown managed the infringing changes authorized in
the treaty honourably.
However, the Supreme Court has previously held that it applies as a
source of obligation independently of treaties as well. It has invoked the
“honour of the Crown” as a central principle in resolving Aboriginal
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claims to consultation in Aboriginal rights cases, both custom and
practice rights, and land ownership rights.6
In Haida Nation, McLachlin C.J. extended its application to
process:
The honour of the Crown also infuses the processes of treaty making
and treaty interpretation. In making and applying treaties, the Crown
must act with honour and integrity, …7

Justice Binnie potentially extended the blanket of the protection of
the honour of the Crown to each and every aspect of Crown-First Nation
relations. In Mikisew Cree he wrote:
… the honour of the Crown was pledged to the fulfilment of its
obligations to the Indians. This had been the Crown’s policy as far
back as the Royal Proclamation of 1763.8

Mikisew Cree infuses the honour of the Crown in the performance
of every treaty obligation, from the making of a treaty, to interpreting a
treaty, to applying treaty, and confirms that the concept will apply
equally to Aboriginal rights as a central principle in resolving
Aboriginal claims to consultation.
And so the Supreme Court has signalled that where there are
Aboriginal and Treaty rights, these will be rigorously, if not ferociously
protected by courts.

IV. THE BALANCE IN THE RESULT
In the time following the Delgamuukw decision, it was reasonable to
predict that Aboriginal title would be based on the area over which a
First Nation asserted sovereignty. Whatever the area ranged by a First
Nation, whatever the intensity or frequency of use of a hunting or
gathering ground, if it was travelled or used by a First Nation, it was
considered to have the potential to be the Aboriginal title land of these
users of the land at the time of sovereignty.

6

R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010; Haida Nation v. British Columbia
(Ministry of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 and Taku River Tlingit Nation v.
British Columbia, [2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550.
7
Haida Nation, id., at para. 19. See also para. 35.
8
Mikisew Cree, supra, note 3, at para. 51.
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The Marshall and Bernard decisions changed all that. In these
decisions, the Supreme Court established the parameters of the lands
that could be set aside for the exclusive use of the pre-sovereignty
inhabitants. Common law Aboriginal title is now restricted to the areas
that were actually used, frequently, by a First Nation community.
Village sites will qualify, as will farms and perhaps hunting and
gathering areas adjacent to the village sites if they were sufficiently
regularly and exclusively used by the community.
These areas will roughly correspond, as a matter of historical fact, to
the areas reserved in the pre-Confederation and numbered treaties that
are now known as “reserves”. Aboriginal title will not extend over
massive areas such as British Columbia, and the concern that Aboriginal
peoples will be able to exclude all others from the use of such areas, is
lifted.
Similarly, treaty rights will evolve, but not into the modern
equivalent of the right protected by the treaty. Rather, only the means of
exercising the right will receive constitutional protection. That means
that historic custom and practices will continue, but not their modern
equivalent. Gathering wood to build structures will not evolve into
gathering lumber to sell to builders of subdivisions.
The implication of the Bernard and Marshall decisions is that an
Aboriginal title land base will not be so extensive as to literally exclude
(at least without the necessity of government expropriation after full
compensation) non-Aboriginal communities from the use of huge tracts
of land — in the case of British Columbia, most of the province. Treaty
rights will not be so extensive that they invade the current economy and
carve out large portions for the exclusive benefit of the holders of the
treaty rights.
Rather, Aboriginal title will be protected based on the formula that
roughly equates to that reflected in the historic treaties, sufficient land to
establish and maintain a community that sustains some level of
exploitation, with use for such activities as hunting, fishing and
gathering together with the non-Aboriginal community, over a larger
area. Treaty rights will be protected based on the principle that it is the
preservation of traditional customs and practices and the traditional
economy that are to be preserved, not the right to participate on a
priority basis in all aspects of the modern economy.
In Mikisew Cree, the Supreme Court of Canada held that although
the Crown had a right, recognized in a treaty, to build a road, it could
not do so in any way that had even a modest negative impact on
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adjacent treaty protected reserve lands, at least without meaningful and
respectful consultation.
What the Supreme Court of Canada has signalled in this year’s
leading decisions is that “firstness” alone will not result in entitlement to
constitutionally protected participation in the economy. It has also
signalled, on the other hand, that where a constitutionally protected right
exists, or may just possibly exist, it must receive a very high degree of
deference and respect and no amount of infringement will be tolerated
without (meaningful) consultation with the affected First Nation.
More importantly, the Court has signalled that it is not a preferential
share of the economy that is protected by section 35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982,9 but rather their diversity, the unique cultural identity of First
Nation peoples.
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court of Canada has this year
reinforced the position it so clearly expressed in R. v. Van Der Peet:
Section 35(1) provides the constitutional framework though which the
fact that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their
own practices, customs and traditions, is acknowledged and reconciled
with the sovereignty of the Crown. 10

It is the distinctiveness, the practices, customs and traditions that
attract constitutional protection. Economic rights, whether section 35
rights or Charter rights, are not protected by the Canadian Constitution.

9
10

Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
[1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507.

